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Abstract
The multi-armed bandit is a mathematical interpretation of
the problem a gambler faces when confronted with a number
of different machines (bandits). The gambler wants to explore
different machines to discover which machine offers the best
rewards, but simultaneously wants to exploit the most prof-
itable machine. A password guesser is faced with a similar
dilemma. They have lists of leaked password sets, dictionaries
of words, and demographic information about the users, but
they don’t know which dictionary will reap the best rewards.
In this paper we provide a framework for using the multi-
armed bandit problem in the context of the password guesser
and use some examples to show that it can be effective.
1 Introduction
Passwords are a widely used form of authentication online.
However, one major weakness of passwords is that human cho-
sen passwords can be easily guessed by automated attacks. In
fact, with the regular occurrence of leaks of password datasets,
attackers are provided with an increasing amount of data to in-
form password guesses. It is important for security advocates
and researchers to understand the capabilities of attackers
given they have access to this data. This way, we can create
countermeasures to protect the security of Internet users.
A commonly used method for guessing passwords involves
using dictionaries of password guesses and guessing these in
an optimum order in order to compromise as many users’ pass-
words as possible. Guessing passwords in the optimal order is
important for an attacker as they wish to compromise as many
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users as possible with a small number of guesses. But given a
selection of passwords datasets, it is a challenge to work out
which dataset will be the most successful at guessing.
In this paper we suggest and develop an explore and exploit
protocol based on the classic multi-armed bandit problem.
This protocol can be used to guess a password set effectively
using guesses from a selection of dictionaries.
In Section 2, we describe related work. In Section 3, we
describe the multi-armed bandit problem in the context of
password guessing and the iterative methods used to solve it.
In Section 4, we describe the implementation of the bandit
model and in Section 5 we provide the results of this imple-
mentation for dictionaries of leaked password sets. Finally, in
Section 6 we summarise our results and plan future work.
2 Related work
For a long time researchers have been interested in mod-
elling and improving password guessing. The first strategic
methods involved dictionary attacks. There were proposed
by Morris and Thompson in 1979 [6] and are still widely
used today [1,2]. In 2005, Narayanan et al. employed Markov
models to enable faster dictionary attacks [8]. In 2009, Weir
et al. used probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG) which
were trained using password breaches and used to assign prob-
abilities to passwords for guessing [9]. In 2013, Dürmuth et
al. proposed an updated password guessing model based on
Markov models, called OMEN [3]. As part of their initial
paper they demonstrated an OMEN specific method for merg-
ing personal information with a dictionary of guesses. They
acknowledged the difficulty of merging guesses from two
different sources. In 2017, Houshmand and Aggarwal created
a method for merging multiple grammars for dictionary-based
PCFG models [5].
Determining the order to make password guesses in is
a hard problem. Particularly when drawing from multiple
sources which often do not provide obvious probability scores.
We imagine an attacker has multiple sources of information
for informing password guesses: previous password leaks,
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
15
90
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
9 J
un
 20
20
personal and demographic information about the users, and
simple dictionary words, among other things. In this paper,
we describe a method for optimising the choice of guesses
by combining the information from all the available dictio-
naries. This is a new piece of research that, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been tackled analytically.
3 Multi armed bandit problem
The multi-armed bandit problem describes the trade-off a
gambler faces when faced with a number of different gam-
bling machines. Each machine provides a random reward
from a probability distribution specific to that machine. The
crucial problem the gambler faces is how much time to spend
exploring different machines and how much time to spend ex-
ploiting the machine that seems to offer the best rewards. The
objective of the gambler is to maximize the sum of rewards
earned through a sequence of lever pulls.
In our scenario, we regard each dictionary as a machine
which will give a certain distribution of successes. We want to
explore the returns from each dictionary and also exploit the
most promising dictionary, in order to make effective guesses.
With each guess we learn more about the distribution of the
password set we are trying to guess. Leveraging this knowl-
edge, we can guess using the dictionary that best matches the
password set distribution, thus maximising rewards.
In the following sections we describe the set up of the multi-
armed bandit problem in the context of password guessing.
3.1 Problem set up
Suppose we have n dictionaries. Each dictionary i = 1 . . .n,
has a probability distribution pi, and σi(k) denotes the posi-
tion of password k in dictionary i. So, the probability assigned
to password k in dictionary i is pi,σi(k).
Suppose we make m guesses where the words guessed are
k j for j = 1 . . .m. Each of these words is guessed against the
N users in the password set and we find N j, the number of
users’ passwords compromised with guess number j.
To model the password set that we are trying to guess, we
suppose it has been generated by choosing passwords from
our n dictionaries. Let qi be the proportion of passwords from
dictionary i that generated the password set. Our aim will be
to estimate q1, · · · ,qn noting that
n
∑
i
qi = 1 and qi ≥ 0. (1)
If the password set was really composed from the dictio-
naries with proportions qi, the probability of seeing password
k in the password set would be
Qk :=
n
∑
i=1
qipi,σi(k). (2)
Given the N j, we will use this probability to build a maximum
likelihood estimator.
3.2 Likelihood estimator
Maximum likelihood estimation is a method for estimating the
parameters of a probability distribution using observed data.
It does so by selecting the parameters so that the observed
data is most probable.
We construct the following likelihood for our model with
m guesses:
L =
(
N
N1 · · · Nm (N−N1 · · ·−Nm)
)
QN
1
k1 Q
N2
k2 · · ·QN
m
km
· (1−Qk1 · · ·−Qkm)N−N1···−Nm
Our goal is the maximise this likelihood function by choos-
ing good estimates for q1, . . .qn based on our observed re-
wards from each previous guess. Note, with each guess we
learn more about qi for all the dictionaries. In fact, one of
the features of this model compared to a traditional multi-
armed bandit model is that when we make a guess we learn
something about all the dictionaries.
3.3 Maximising the likelihood function
Except in limited cases, the likelihood equation cannot be
solved explicitly. We choose to use gradient descent to find the
qi that maximiseL afterm guesses subject to the constraints in
(1). We were able to prove that the log-likelihood function for
our system is concave, and therefore the likelihood function
has a unique maximum value.
We iteratively changed the estimated qi values, qˆi. To en-
sure we met the constraints in (1), we project the gradient
vector onto the probability simplex and then constrain our
steps so that we always stay within that space.
Using this gradient descent method, we should be able to
estimate the parameters q1, · · · ,qn for each dictionary based
on the information we have collected from previous guesses.
3.4 Gradient descent results
The goal of the gradient descent is to converge towards the
maximum of the likelihood function and thus find the propor-
tions qi that provide the best explanation of the distribution
of the password set seen after m guesses.
To determine whether this is working we take four different
leaked password datasets as dictionaries. The datasets we used
are leaked passwords from users of hotmail.com, flirtlife.de,
computerbits.ie and 000webhost.com. They contain 7300,
98912, 1795 and 15,252,206 users’ passwords respectively1.
1The datasets were compromised by various methods so the lists may
only contain a random, and possibly biased, sample of users [7]. As far as
we can tell only the 000webhost dataset imposed composition policies on
users [4].
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Figure 1: Estimating the distribution of passwords using in-
formation from 1 guess.
We took a random sample of 1000 users’ passwords from
the 98912 users in the flirtlife dataset. In previous work, we
showed that when guessing a sample of leaked passwords
from a website, the most effective guesses will come from the
passwords of other users of that same site [7]. Therefore, if
the multi-armed bandit is effective we expect it to show that
the sample most closely compares to the flirtlife dictionary.
In Figure 1, we show the q values estimates during the con-
vergence of the gradient descent for the likelihood function
seeded with just one guess. This single guess was the pass-
word 123456, widely considered the most commonly used
password. We began by setting the qˆ-values to 1/n = 0.25,
and then used 100 steps of gradient descent to estimate the
proportions. As expected, the estimation suggests that a high
proportion of the passwords in the sample were drawn from
the flirtlife.de dictionary.
The password 123456 occurred in all four password sets but
using the distribution of those datasets the likelihood function
was able to determine that the proportion in the sample best
matched the proportion in flirtlife. If we were guessing the
full flirtlife dataset with several guesses, rather than just a
sample from it with one guess, then this proportion would be
closer to 100%.
The optimization assigns a non-zero proportion to two of
the other dictionaries. This implies these dictionaries hold
some guessing value. As we collect more information from
additional guesses the proportion assigned to those dictionar-
ies will converge to zero.
In the above example, all 1000 passwords came from a ran-
dom sample of flirtlife. We will investigate in later examples
(e.g. Figure 2 and Figure 4) whether the maximum likelihood
estimation can determine the breakdown of where passwords
come from when composed of different dictionaries.
4 Multi-armed bandit model
Let us now suggest some variations of the gradient descent
and the maximum likelihood estimates when forming a pass-
word guessing multi-armed bandit. We are interested in which
of these variations produces the best results.
4.1 Gradient descent initialization variables
We expect the gradient descent to improve with each guess
made since every guess allows it to gain more information.
There are a number of ways of initialising the gradient descent
after each guess provides new information. The following are
three different methods for choosing the initialisation value:
Random Randomly pick starting values for qˆi, subject to (1)
Average Choose the average starting value, i.e. assume the
passwords are distributed evenly between the n dictio-
naries, so qˆi = 1/n
Best Use our previous best estimate for the qˆ-values, based
on the gradient descent results for the previous guess.
4.2 Informing our guess choices
Once we have generated our estimate of the qˆ-values, we
want to use them to inform our next guess. We suggest three
options for how to choose our next guess:
Random Randomly choose a dictionary and guess the next
most popular password in that dictionary.
Best dictionary Guess the next most popular password from
the dictionary with the highest corresponding qˆ-value.
By Q Use all the information from all the qˆ-values for the
dictionaries and all the frequencies of the passwords in
the dictionaries to inform our next guess.
These options have different advantages. In the first option,
we randomly choose a dictionary to guess from, but we are
still taking the most probable guess from the dictionary we
choose. This option emphasises the continued exploration of
all the dictionaries. In the second option, we are choosing the
dictionary we believe accounts for the largest proportion of
the password set.
The last option is specifically basing password guess
choices on equation (2). It uses our predicted qˆ-values to
estimate the probability of seeing each word k. If, for exam-
ple, we have a word k which has frequency f1(k) in dictionary
1 but also occurs in dictionary 2 and 3 with frequencies f2(k)
and f3(k) respectively. Using the above computation, where
pi,σi(k) = fi(k)/size of dictionary i, we can compute the total
probability of this word occurring in the password set. This
method should determine which word k has the highest prob-
ability of being in the password set and use this word as our
next guess.
5 Multi-armed bandit Results
We will now look at some examples of the performance of our
multi-armed bandit model. It will guess one word at a time
and then compute the estimated weighting of each dictionary.
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Figure 2: Password set 1 q-value estimates. Initialization:
average qˆ-values, Guessing: by Q .
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Figure 3: Guessing returns for password set 1.
We will vary the composition of the password set and consider
some of the variations described in Section 4.
5.1 Password set 1: 60% flirtlife, 30% hotmail,
10% computerbits
We begin by guessing a password set made up of 10,000 users’
passwords; 60% were selected randomly from flirtlife, 30%
from hotmail and 10% from the computerbits users.
In Figure 2, we plot the estimated q-values after the gradient
descent was completed for each guess. For this graph, the
gradient descent was initialised using average qˆ-values, qˆi =
1/3, and the Q method was used for guessing. The actual
proportions are shown as solid horizontal lines. Even after a
small number of guesses we have good predictions for how
the password set is distributed between the three dictionaries.
In Figure 3, we show the number of users successfully com-
promised as the number of guesses increases. The successes
are the average over fifty runs to reduce the variance from
the random guessing method. Results are shown for each
combination of initialisation and guessing method. As one
might expect, picking guesses from a dictionary at random
resulted in the lowest success rates. Both the Q method and
guessing from the best dictionary resulted in successes very
close to the optimal line. After 100 guesses these methods
had compromised 795 users, in comparison to the 870 users
compromised by guessing the correct password in the correct
order for every guess.
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Figure 4: Password set 2 q-value estimates. Initialization:
random qˆ-values, Guessing: random dictionary.
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Figure 5: Guessing returns for password set 2.
5.2 Password set 2: 60% 000webhost, 30%
hotmail, 10% computerbits
In Figure 4, we show the estimated q-values for a 10,000 user
password set made from 000webhost, hotmail and computer-
bits with a 6:3:1 split. Again, we get very good estimates for
the q-values. As the 000webhost passwords had composition
rules in force but the other dictionaries did not, we may see
different behaviour for the guessing successes.
In Figure 5, we show the guessing success rate. Interest-
ingly, in this case, guessing from the best dictionary per-
formed even worse than guessing from a random dictionary.
This could be a reflection of the make-up of the 000web-
host dataset. It was the only dataset which included rules on
how passwords should be formatted [4]. In our previous re-
search [7] we found that this made it less effective at guessing.
Here we are likely seeing a reflection of that.
The Q method of guessing would also be skewed by the
high ranking of the 000webhost passwords and their low
guessing success. However, it still performs slightly better
than the random method, and significantly better than guess-
ing from the best dictionary (avg. results over 100 trials).
Initialising with random q-values performs better than other
initialisation methods when guessing using the best dictionary
method. When q-values are initialised randomly, one dictio-
nary can be ranked very high in comparison to the others and
the gradient descent may not have been given sufficient time
to converge. In this case, a password set other than 000web-
host can be ranked as best. It is this that allows the random
method to perform better than the other initialisation methods.
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Figure 6: Password set 3 q-value estimates. Initialization:
previous best qˆ-values, Guessing: random dictionary.
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Av
er
ag
e 
Su
cc
es
se
s
Guesses
Randomqs : by Q
Randomqs : from_best
Randomqs : from_rand
Averageqs : by Q
Averageqs : from_best
Averageqs : from_rand
Bestqs : from_best
Bestqs : from_rand
Bestqs : by Q
Optimum
Figure 7: Guessing returns for password set 3.
5.3 Password set 3: 55% hotmail, 30% flirtlife,
10% 000webhost, 5% computerbits
The final password set we look at is composed of 10,000 users’
passwords from 4 different dictionaries. In Figure 6, we dis-
play the estimated q-values. Figure 7 shows the successes
when guessing this password set. Again, we see that the Q
method is effective at guessing, this time performing signifi-
cantly better than the other guessing methods. We notice that
the successes are close to the optimal. Particularly for the first
20 guesses, where the Q method compromised 303 users in
comparison to 317 compromised by optimal guessing.
5.4 Discussion of Results
We have seen that for a variety of synthetic examples, guess-
ing using the multi-armed bandit technique can be effective
both for compromising users and estimating how the pass-
words have been chosen. We believe both these aims may
be useful. Knowing the breakdown of a password set could
help determine whether a leak of passwords is coming from
different sources or uncover characteristics of a password sets’
distribution.
In all examples we saw that guessing using the Q function
is consistently effective in comparison to other dictionary
selection methods. In general, we found that the initializa-
tion method had little bearing on the success results. This
stems from the concave nature of our log-likelihood function,
meaning that, for most set-ups, the function will converge to
a single maximum when estimating the distributions. Note
that the q-value estimates shown in Fig. 2, Fig. 4 and Fig. 6
are from one iteration of the multi-armed bandit on a given
dataset. If we repeat the experiment and take averages for
each qˆ-value, we expect increased accuracy.
6 Conclusion
We used a multi-armed bandit approach to uncover the distri-
bution of a password set and to optimise the order we chose
passwords for guessing from dictionaries. Thus, improving
the success of our guessing. In future work we plan to investi-
gate these results in relation to guessing real leaked password
datasets.
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